Stan Abbott looks at the demise of Eastern Airways and reflects on the health of what now remains of the UK’s domestic aviation sector
Eastern Airways was one of UK aviation’s great survivors for more than a quarter of a century. So when the Humberside-based wet lease, ad hoc and scheduled service carrier announced it was poised to go into administration, the news sent shockwaves across an industry that has struggled to recover its mojo ever since the twin shocks of Covid-19 and Brexit.
This is not the kind of administration I remember from my own time at Gill Airways, in Newcastle, back in the late 1990s, when the procedure was used by a management team to create the space to negotiate with creditors and put the airline back on a sound financial footing. It was a successful process that took a year or so, only to be followed by the devastating events of 9/11 and Gill’s consequent ultimate demise.
Given the sector’s general travails, I wondered what so set Eastern apart that it was the first to topple. [Note: This article was filed before Blue Islands ceased operations – Ed] Some have cited the airline’s weak balance sheet and underlying lack of profitability, but I am unsure whether this reflects a correct interpretation of the complexities in the filed accounts, given the high level of inter-trading between Eastern Airways (UK) Ltd and Air Kilroe Ltd, both of which formally entered administration on November 7th.
Eastern had always made a point of not having all its eggs in one basket, and yet failure appeared to be down to having too large of a clutch in a basket labelled KLM.
Airline failures are a bit like air crashes: they are rarely if ever caused by one problem alone. In Eastern’s case, it was manifestly the unexpected loss of its single biggest revenue stream at very short notice that tipped it over the edge. But other factors were at play. Eastern had been operating on behalf of KLM City Hopper for a year, initially operating all flights between Humberside and Amsterdam and from a new base at Teesside, as well as off-peak Amsterdam feeders at several UK airports, including Glasgow, Newcastle, Manchester and Birmingham. New bases were added at Bristol and Leeds Bradford in the Summer season, as well as a link to Hanover, in Germany.
But KLM only terminated the operations because of a reported 13 per cent decline in transatlantic traffic apparently due to unease regarding the current Trump presidency, leading in turn to weaker traffic from the UK to Amsterdam. Few would have forecast this by-product of even the most unexpectedly harsh and turbulent Trump regime. The former Eastern sectors are now being operated by City Hopper, KLM mainline or, in some instances, Air France’s Hop subsidiary.
Having invested heavily in recruitment and new Embraer leases, the shock was too significant and too sudden for Eastern to withstand. Other factors, however, included the extremely sluggish UK domestic market since Covid-19 pushed meetings online; dollar-based fuel prices, which have remained high ever since the pound sterling lost 15 per cent of its value following the Brexit vote; the steep fall in Aberdeen traffic to service the declining North Sea oil fields; and rising crew and aircraft spares costs post-pandemic.
Offshore operations
The fact that Eastern was around for so long was thanks in large measure to its ability to react nimbly and cleverly to seize opportunities when they arose. Its first route served the then vibrant UK offshore oil and gas industry, flying a leased Metroliner between Humberside and Aberdeen after Air UK became KLM UK and pulled off Aberdeen routes originally operated by Air Anglia.
Eastern got its AOC by acquiring Manchester-based Air Kilroe, which operated a Jetstream 31 shuttle linking ICI plants on Teesside and in Cheshire, but the big breakthrough was the acquisition of British Airways CitiExpress’s 12-strong Jetstream 41 fleet and spares for a reputed “song” in 2003.
The J41 proved ideal for ferrying offshore workers, in particular between Aberdeen and anything up to nine other airports. With a 29-seat capacity, the aircraft could offer up to four or five flights a day on key routes, such as Newcastle, which also became the airline’s second major hub, with destinations including Birmingham, Cardiff, the Isle of Man, Belfast City and, for a time, London City.
In 2010 Eastern acquired Plymouth-based Air South West from Sutton Harbour, the leaseholders of Plymouth Airport, but – having spent time and money merging the two AOCs – Eastern almost immediately shut the airline down, raising more than a few eyebrows. Sutton Harbour remains in dispute with owners Plymouth City Council over the failure to comply with its lease terms, which stipulate operating an airport.
With significant charter contracts for the oil industry in particular, second-hand Saabs added capacity on scheduled routes, eventually replaced by ATR 72s.
Norway no-way
Attempts to enter the Norwegian market were ill conceived, costly and quickly abandoned, as was a Brussels service from Teesside, much lobbied for but never much used by local business. A relatively brief London City service from Newcastle was supported by an advertising campaign so cryptic it might as well have been promoting cornflakes.
The sale of a major shareholding to Bristow in 2014 was quickly reversed when Bristow chose to exit fixed-wing operations and apparently resold to Eastern for “buttons”.
A franchise agreement with Flybe failed when the relaunch of the latter, with Stobart and Virgin investment, collapsed and Covid-19 followed soon afterwards. A deal to build a network of domestic services out of Teesside was scuppered by Loganair, which used its relative muscle to duplicate the services, only to cancel them.
Eastern also dabbled in France, pre-Brexit, operating PSO and locally subsidised routes, before winning PSO contracts closer to home: Anglesey to Cardiff, Wick to Aberdeen, and Newquay to Gatwick, the latter two of which were still in place up to the point of the appointment of administrators.
Whether these PSO routes were adding a great deal to the bottom line, however, is open to question: there were reliability issues around both, with consequent delay and cancellation payments to passengers and expensive taxi fares to pay. The reality is that it is challenging to operate a service with a single based turboprop far from home – a fact that those paying the public subsidy may have struggled to understand.
There’s a lesson to be learned from the Norway and Teesside fiascos: independent regional carriers are too small to waste time and resources by fighting each other. Loganair, Guernsey-based Blue Islands and Aurigny, and Isles of Scilly Skybus announced a broad interline cooperation in 2021. It didn’t last long, as Loganair launched direct services from Southampton to Jersey earlier this year.
Skybus, in a move masterminded by chief executive Jonathan Hinkles – is set to take over the Newquay-Gatwick PSO service in its first foray into the more‑than-20-seats market.
Philip Saunders recently arrived at Aurigny, Guernsey’s state-owned carrier, as chief commercial officer, bringing with him a reputation for turning round commercial performance in several airlines, earned across 35 years in all quarters of Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Caribbean. He candidly admits that 2024 was challenging for Aurigny. The solution lies, he says, in focusing on the simple core mission of “serving the people of Guernsey”.
Turboprop cooperation
That means, ideally, one aircraft type, though Twin Otters (supported by Skybus) have just replaced the Dorniers. It also means a sharp focus on and investment in all aspects of the service. “It’s a bigger challenge in the turboprop environment than in the jet environment,” he says.
Cooperation makes more sense than cut-throat competition: “Where we can cooperate with other airlines to the mutual benefit of our customers, then that’s the sensible thing to do,”
With the threat of even tougher EU compensation rules for consequential delays, it begs the question of whether UK domestic aviation is sustainable at all, outside the heavily trafficked trunk routes – now the domain of BA, easyJet and Ryanair – and PSO services. Some will suggest that Flybe did OK… for a time. But a closer examination of Flybe’s accounts would have revealed some extraordinary one-off “wins”.
Some that spring to mind are the BAe compensation for failure to proceed with its twin-engined successor to the Avro RJ; the sale of slots at Heathrow that probably belonged to Air France; and the sale of its slots at Gatwick.
But optimism was and remains a cornerstone of civil aviation history. They say never say never and, given the nimble business feet of co-founder and principal owner Richard Lake, and subject to CAA approval, it would be unwise to rule out ‘Eastern Two’ rising phoenix-like from the ashes of administration to resume the most profitable activities, such as football team ferries.
This article appears in the current November/December issue of Low-Cost & Regional Airline Business. It was prepared after Eastern Airways closed, but before Blue Islands ceased operations.







